

**Inputs to the Special Court Reporter on
the Independence of Judges and
Attorneys,
for the report on the independence of
judicial systems in the presence of
contemporary challenges to democracy**

presented by the

#LAJUSTICIAQUEQUEREMOS

collective

**Focusing on Prosecutor's Offices
Mexico, January 2024**



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Collective #LaJusticiaQueQueremos

It is an articulation of organizations, collectives of victims and other allies and allies with a recognized track record in the defense and promotion of justice in Mexico and the region, whose general objective is to achieve equal justice for all people, and that impunity ceases to be customary in the country.

Our general objective is to visualize the deficiencies and areas of opportunity in the functioning of the institutions of diligent management and administration of justice to contribute to their improvement, to substantive equality in the justice system and to the eradication of impunity, through active participation and the demand for rights.

Report coordinated by: [México Evalúa \(Mexico Evaluates\)](#) and [Impunidad Cero \(Zero Impunity\)](#).

Organizations that contributed to this document: [Fundación para la Justicia y el Estado Democrático de Derecho \(FJEDD\) \(Foundation for Justice and the Democratic State of Law\)](#), Plataforma por la Paz y la Justicia en Guanajuato (Platform for Peace and Justice in Guanajuato), and the Observatorio de Designaciones Públicas (Observatory of Public Designations).

Contact: justiciayestadodederecho@gmail.com

Introduction

The independence of Prosecutors' Offices is closely related to access to justice, since it conditions the effectiveness of an investigation. The dependence that a Prosecutor's Office has with respect to other institutions or interests can impact both "the effectiveness and momentum in investigations, as well as the decision to exercise criminal action or file of the investigation, as well as the implications it has on due process". Without institutional autonomy and independence, in law and in practice, the State is unable to effectively prosecute the crime, which means that the courts cannot prosecute cases either. The independence of Prosecutors' Offices is closely related to access to justice, since it conditions the effectiveness of an investigation¹. The dependence that a Prosecutor's Office has with respect to other institutions or interests can impact both "the effectiveness and momentum in investigations, as well as the decision to exercise criminal action or file of the investigation, as well as the implications it has on due process"². Without institutional autonomy and independence, in law and in practice, the State is unable to effectively prosecute the crime, which means that the courts cannot prosecute cases either³.

In this contribution, we highlight the transition that Prosecutors' Offices in Mexico have gone through, moving from Attorney General's Offices to autonomous Prosecutors' Offices, and the impact of this on their independence and performance. At the same time, we warn about the recent attacks on the staff of the Prosecutors' Offices and the lack of mechanisms for their registration and attention.

Ineffectiveness and lack of independence

Given the criminal justice model in Mexico, it is the Prosecutors' Offices that are responsible for receiving the complaint or report of a crime, directing their investigation and, subsequently, performing criminal action. In 2014, a constitutional reform granted constitutional autonomy to the General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic (FGR by its Spanish acronym), formerly the Attorney General's Office of Justice, an institution that was under the control of the Federal Executive Branch. Behind the reform was the intention to influence the most important challenges for the diligent management of justice in Mexico: combating impunity, opacity in the actions of the Public Ministry and its capture by interests outside the diligent management of justice. This change triggered a wave of reforms at the state level, with which practically all the Attorney General's Offices moved towards the model of the Prosecutors' Offices with constitutional autonomy. Ten years after this significant reform, formal autonomy has not proven to improve the effectiveness of Prosecutors' Offices in the prosecution of crime, nor guarantee their independence. Given the criminal justice model in Mexico, it is the Prosecutors' Offices that are responsible for receiving the complaint or report of a crime, directing their investigation and, subsequently, performing criminal action⁴. In 2014, a constitutional reform

1 Court IDH. Case of Gutierrez and family v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 25 November 2013. Series C No. 271, para. 120.

2 I/A Commission on Human Rights, Guarantees for the Independence of Justice Operators. Towards Strengthening Access to Justice and the Rule of Law in the Americas, para. 37 (2013).

3 Court IDH. Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits and Reparations. Judgment of October 6, 2020. Series C No. 412, para. 87.

4 This is dictated by article 21 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States.

granted constitutional autonomy to the General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic (FGR by its Spanish acronym), formerly the Attorney General's Office of Justice, an institution that was under the control of the Federal Executive Branch. Behind the reform was the intention to influence the most important challenges for the diligent management of justice in Mexico: combating impunity, opacity in the actions of the Public Ministry and its capture by interests outside the diligent management of justice⁵. This change triggered a wave of reforms at the state level, with which practically all the Attorney General's Offices moved towards the model of the Prosecutors' Offices with constitutional autonomy⁶.

On the one hand, 92.4% of the crimes that occurred during 2022 were not reported to the authorities, a black figure that has remained constant over the last 12 years. In 2022 alone, state Prosecutors' Offices initiated a total of 2.06 millions of investigations (investigation portfolios) based on the complaints received. However, it is estimated that only 3.7% of all cases under investigation reach an effective conclusion or response, so **impunity** at the national level reaches 96.3% of cases, 10% higher than the estimate for 2017. The same happens in the federal jurisdiction, where the General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic is reluctant to open investigations, depends largely on flagrancy to prosecute cases, and where the level of impunity was estimated at 96.1% in 2021. On the one hand, 92.4% of the crimes that occurred during 2022 were not reported to the authorities⁷, a black figure that has remained constant over the last 12 years. In 2022 alone, state Prosecutors' Offices initiated a total of 2.06 million of investigations (investigation portfolios) based on the complaints received⁸ at the national level reaches 96.3% of cases⁹, 10% higher than the estimate for 2017¹⁰. The same happens in the federal jurisdiction, where the General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic is reluctant to open investigations, depends largely on flagrancy to prosecute cases, and where the level of impunity was estimated at 96.1% in 2021¹¹.

This ineffectiveness affects both higher incidence and high-impact crimes, which is closely related to the fact that only half of the state Prosecutors' Offices have some criminal policy instrument and that most are recently issued. Thus, in the case of intentional homicide, the level of impunity amounted to 95.7% in 2022, while in cumulative terms (2016-2021) impunity was estimated at 92.8%. In the case of the crime of enforced disappearance, it is estimated that, in 2022, it reached 96.5% impunity, as well as 99% in cumulative terms. This

5 Mexico Evaluates. *Linements for the appointment of attorneys general*. 2023, pg. 6, available at: <https://www.mexicoevalua.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/lineamientos.pdf>

6 Of 32 prosecutor's offices at the local level, 29 are formally recognized as prosecutor's offices, while 3 of them remain as dependencies of the State Executive: Baja California Sur, Hidalgo and Tlaxcala. However, in the rest, the transitions to autonomous prosecutor's offices have represented strictly nominal changes, without noticing real changes in their performance and organization.

7 INEGI. *National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Safety (ENVIPE)* 2023. Available at: https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/programas/envipe/2023/doc/envipe2023_4_denuncia_delito.pdf

8 According to data from the Evaluation and Monitoring Model for the Consolidation of the Criminal Justice System (MES) of the Ministry of the Interior.

9 Mexico Evaluates. *Findings 2022 Monitoring and evaluation of criminal justice in Mexico*. 2023, pg. 14, available at: <https://www.mexicoevalua.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/HALLAZGOS2022.pdf>

10 Mexico Evaluates. *Findings 2017 Monitoring and evaluation of criminal justice in Mexico*. 2018, pg. 14, available at: <https://www.mexicoevalua.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/HALLAZGOS2022.pdf>

11 *Mexico Evaluates*. "Let's imagine a Prosecutor's Office without Gertz." Christel Rosales. January 21, 2023, available at:

<https://www.mexicoevalua.org/imaginemos-una-fiscalia-sin-gertz/>

ineffectiveness affects both higher incidence and high-impact¹² crimes, which is closely related to the fact that only half of the state Prosecutors' Offices have some criminal policy instrument and that most are recently issued¹³. Thus, in the case of intentional homicide, the level of impunity amounted to 95.7% in 2022¹⁴, while in cumulative terms (2016-2021) impunity was estimated at 92.8%¹⁵. In the case of the crime of enforced disappearance, it is estimated that, in 2022, it reached 96.5% impunity¹⁶, as well as 99% in cumulative terms¹⁷.

We can observe the same ineffectiveness for crimes that have migrants as victims. According to the Migration Policy Unit of the Ministry of the Interior, 5,684 migrants reported having been victims of a crime in Mexican territory between 2016 and 2022. However, the Attorney General's Office (FGR by its Spanish acronym) only recorded 455 crimes for that period. Of the more than 90,000 cases of trafficking and kidnapping of migrants estimated by the National Human Rights Commission, between 2009 and 2020, the Attorney General's Office investigated only 110 crimes of trafficking in persons and kidnapping.

As part of these diagnoses carried out by civil society, a considerable number of requests for access to public information have been addressed to State and Federal Prosecutors' Offices. The answers granted by these Prosecutors' Offices showed the lack of will and institutional openness to disclose relevant information about their performance. This opacity is in turn nourished by inefficient legal resources that do not guarantee access to information in a timely manner.

Regarding the performance of Prosecutors' Offices in safeguarding democracy and human rights, in Mexico we have the Specialized Prosecutor's Office for Electoral Crimes (FEPADE by its Spanish acronym), which is one of the institutions, along with the National Electoral Institute (INE) and the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary, which monitor electoral processes.

Unfortunately, FEPADE turns out to be a [link of impunity in Mexico](#), due to the inefficiency in clarifying electoral crimes; the delay and incorrect determination of the folders is the first obstacle for these to be sanctioned. , due to the inefficiency in clarifying electoral crimes; the delay and incorrect determination of the folders is the first obstacle for these to be sanctioned¹⁸.

12 According to the 2022 *Findings* report, it is estimated that during 2022 the crime of family violence reached a level of impunity of 98.6%, while the crime of drug dealing reached a figure of 94.1%.

13 At the end of 2022, only 16 of the 32 state prosecutors' offices in Mexico had a criminal prosecution policy.

14 Mexico Evaluates. *Findings 2022 Monitoring and evaluation of criminal justice in Mexico*. 2023, pg. 18, available at: <https://www.mexicoevalua.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/HALLAZGOS2022.pdf>

15 Zero Impunity. *Impunity in intentional homicide and femicide 2022*. 2022, p. 25, available at: <https://www.impunidadcero.org/uploads/app/articulo/175/contenido/1669895146115.pdf>

16 Mexico Evaluates. *Findings 2022 Monitoring and evaluation of criminal justice in Mexico*. 2023, pg. 19, available at: <https://www.mexicoevalua.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/HALLAZGOS2022.pdf>

17 Zero Impunity. *Impunity in crimes of disappearance in Mexico*. 2023, available at: <https://www.impunidadcero.org/uploads/app/articulo/196/contenido/1701870164C42.pdf>

18 Bolaños Bianca and Medellín Corte Ángeles, *La FEPADE: Un eslabón de cadena de impunidad en los crímenes electorales*, Impunidad Cero, 2018. Available at: <https://www.impunidadcero.org/articulo.php?id=63&t=la-fepade-un-eslabon-en-la-cadena-de-impunidad-en-los-delitos-electorales>

On the other hand, the existing designation models in Mexico have not been able to guarantee the selection of suitable profiles, nor the permanence of the designated persons until the end of their assignment in senior management, such as the heads of the specialized Prosecutor's Offices. This is of utmost relevance, since an adequate designation procedure is the first guarantee or safeguard for the independence of the Prosecutor's Offices. In the Mexican case, the Federal Constitution leaves to the State Constitutions the competence to determine the type of procedure to designate the Attorneys General, so at the state level at least four designation models coexist. On the other hand, the existing designation models in Mexico have not been able to guarantee the selection of suitable profiles, nor the permanence of the designated persons until the end of their assignment in senior management, such as the heads of the specialized Prosecutor's Offices¹⁹. This is of utmost relevance, since an adequate designation procedure is the first guarantee or safeguard for the independence of the Prosecutor's Offices²⁰. In the Mexican case, the Federal Constitution leaves to the State Constitutions the competence to determine the type of procedure to designate the Attorneys General, so at the state level at least four designation models coexist²¹.

Only in eight states, 25%, is the designation procedure expected to begin with the issuance of an open public call. In contrast, in the vast majority of cases the procedure begins with the integration of an initial list of candidates, proposed by the Executive Branch or the Congress. In six states, the procedure begins with a single candidate proposed by the State Executive who is sent to Congress for ratification and only in three cases the participation of an instance made up of independent experts is foreseen. In short, the current configuration of the legal framework favors the politicization of designations processes and does not encourage designations to be made through a competitive and merit-based examination. Only in eight states, 25%, is the designation procedure expected to begin with the issuance of an open public call. In contrast, in the vast majority of cases the procedure begins with the integration of an initial list of candidates, proposed by the Executive Branch or the Congress. In six states, the procedure begins with a single candidate proposed by the State Executive who is sent to Congress for ratification²² and only in three cases the participation of an instance made up of independent experts is foreseen²³.

From October 2022 to October 2023 alone, a total of nine Attorneys General, about 30%, resigned from their post in crisis contexts, surrounded by political pressures. The incumbents reported leaving the position for "personal reasons" or in agreement with the Executive Branch, without carrying out an accountability exercise in which they justified their resignation. This shows that the Prosecutors' Offices are diminished in their legitimacy and that they continue to behave more as an extension of the Executive Power in turn, than as an institution

19 Colectivo contra la Impunidad, "Fiscalómetro, ¿Cómo frente nuestro país su impunidad", 2000, available at: <https://www.fundacionjusticia.org/fiscalometro/>

20 Due Process Foundation. Guidelines for the selection of senior authorities of the justice system: prosecutor or attorney general. 2017, pg.4, available at: https://dplf.org/sites/default/files/lineamientos_fiscalia_dplfwebversion.pdf

21 Mexico Evaluates. *Guidelines for the appointment of attorneys general*. 2023, pg. 15, available at: <https://www.mexicoevalua.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/lineamientos.pdf>

22 Baja California, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, Sonora and Colima.

23 Such is the case of Nuevo León, Mexico City and Sinaloa.

with constitutional autonomy. From October 2022 to October 2023 alone, a total of nine Attorneys General, about 30%, resigned from their post²⁴.

It should be noted that in the vast majority of these resignations, the Local Congresses carried out new *fast track* designation processes that did not have the issuance of an open call and that did not allow an evaluation based on objective criteria of the profiles. Instead, designation procedures were carried out through previously established political agreements between Local Executive Powers and Local Congresses.

Even in states where the participation of citizens (independent experts) in the designation processes is foreseen, these have proven to be ineffective in objectively assessing the merit of candidates, since these citizen spaces are captured by political parties. This is the case of Nuevo León and Mexico City, entities that are currently going through a process of renewal of the ownership of their General Prosecutors' Offices.

In the first case, the Selection Committee in charge of examining the applications was limited to verifying compliance with the submission of documents to cover a series of minimum requirements provided for in the respective call. Subsequently, the committee sent the Local Congress a list of candidates in which it excluded only two of the 65 people registered for the call, without evaluating compliance with the profile provided for in the law, or the capacities or suitability of each candidacy. In the first case, the Selection Committee in²⁵ charge of examining the applications was limited to verifying compliance with the submission of documents to cover a series of minimum requirements provided for in the respective call. Subsequently, the committee sent the Local Congress a list of candidates in which it excluded only two of the 65 people registered for the call, without evaluating compliance with the profile provided for in the law, or the capacities or suitability of each candidacy²⁶.

In the case of Mexico City, it was the Citizen Judicial Council that participated in the recent ratification procedure of the Attorney General, which had the manifest support of the majority in Congress and the Head of Government. Mexico City provides in its Local Constitution the possibility that the responsibility of Attorney General be ratified on one occasion based on his performance, which allows the incumbent to remain in office for four more years. At this point, we emphasize that ratification is not the ideal mechanism for the replacement of Attorneys General. The international parameter indicates that it is preferable to have *non-ratifiable* mandates, given that ratification entails a risk of political interference or, if you want to see it that way, of 'activation' of political actors in favor of renewal. In this case, at the beginning of the ratification procedure, the Council approved a deficient methodology to evaluate the performance of the Prosecutor and then departed from it when issuing its final assessment on the ratification, which it approved without transparency the weightings made in each of the aspects evaluated. This favorable opinion passed to Congress, where it failed to reach the

24 This is the case of the states of Nuevo León, Oaxaca, Chihuahua, State of Mexico, Durango, Sonora, Quintana Roo, Baja California and Zacatecas, states that represent almost 30% of the total states of the country.

25 This Selection Committee is made up of nine people from higher education and research institutions; civil society organizations that participate in oversight, accountability and the fight against corruption; and professional groups, which are selected by the state congress.

26 This is stated in the Selection Committee Agreement 005 available at <https://www.hcnl.gob.mx/pdf/sea/acuerdos-2022-2025/005.pdf>

required qualified majority, so a new public call for this high public responsibility will be issued in the short term. In the case of Mexico City, it was²⁷ mandates, given that ratification entails a risk of political interference or, if you want to see it that way, of 'activation' of political actors in favor of renewal²⁸. In this case, at the beginning of the ratification procedure, the Council approved a deficient methodology to evaluate the performance of the Prosecutor and then departed from it when issuing its final assessment on the ratification, which it approved without transparency the weightings made in each of the aspects evaluated²⁹.

Although legislative proposals are identified to reform the Federal Constitution and standardize the designation procedures and duration of the holders of the Prosecutors' Offices, they have not advanced in their legislative process since they were presented, nor are there ongoing initiatives for the discussion of a general law of designations that addresses the disparities and areas of opportunity observed at the state level. Although legislative proposals are identified to reform the Federal Constitution and standardize the designation procedures and duration of the holders of the Prosecutors' Offices³⁰.

The case of the state of Guanajuato is also relevant, since local and national organizations challenged the process of designating the Attorney General in 2019, alleging the absence of an ideal profile and independence of the then Prosecutor Carlos Zamarripa, who is constituted as the longest-serving Prosecutor in the public administration, adding 15 years in the institution. According to Article 95 of the Local Constitution, the Prosecutor, who was imposed by automatic pass, would be in office until 2028. This contestation was rejected by the Federal Justice, which considered that the Local Legislative Power has autonomous powers for the designation of the Prosecutor, ignoring the standard of Article 102 of the Federal Constitution that had eliminated the automatic pass, as well as the recognition of the legitimate interest of civil society and human rights defenders who claimed to be affected by this imposition.

Attacks on Prosecutors' Offices

It emphasizes that there is currently no formal or institutional mechanism for monitoring the attacks perpetrated against the substantive personnel of the Prosecutors' Offices in Mexico, so there are no records or databases to monitor them and, consequently, implement the necessary measures to safeguard their integrity.

27 The Citizen Judicial Council is composed of eleven people of whom seven must be professionals in law; all must enjoy a good reputation, be distinguished by their honorability and independence, have no conflict of interest, and have not participated in elections four years before their appointment.

28 Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers. A/HRC/20/19, 7 June 2012, para. 65.

29 This can be seen in the Minutes of the fourth ordinary session of the Citizen Judicial Council of Mexico City on October 16, 2023.

30 On March 24, 2022, Senator Olga Sánchez Cordero presented to the Senate of the Republic a draft constitutional reform to standardize the prosecutors' offices at the national level as constitutionally autonomous bodies and incorporate minimum parameters and general bases for the designation and removal of their holders, which can be consulted here: https://infosen.senado.gob.mx/sgsp/gaceta/65/1/2022-03-24-1/assets/documentos/Ini_Morena_Sen_Olga_Fraccion_IX_Art_116_Fraccion_X_Apartado_A_Art_12_2_CPEUM.pdf

Only during 2023 were at least six highly relevant attacks against senior officials of different Prosecutors' Offices documented. These events involved everything from attacks on the premises of the Prosecutors' Offices, to the illegal deprivation of liberty and the murder of officials. The attacks are identified as reprisals undertaken by criminal groups due to the actions of the Prosecutors' Offices investigating crimes against them or because they are carrying out actions on behalf of other criminal groups. The case of an ambush of a vehicle of the General Prosecutor's Office of the State of Jalisco that came to attend a report of the location of human remains and that was ambushed with explosives in the municipality of Tlajomulco de Zúñiga, Jalisco, stands out. This attack resulted in the deaths of six people and a dozen injured. In turn, the case of Guerrero stands out, a state where in a matter of days a Regional Prosecutor of the State Prosecutor's Office and a Delegate of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic were killed, while a Deputy Prosecutor and a Director of Investigation were victims of an attempted homicide. Only during 2023 were at least six highly relevant attacks against senior officials of different Prosecutors' Offices documented. These events involved everything from attacks on the premises of the Prosecutors' Offices, to the illegal deprivation of liberty and the murder of officials³¹.

Likewise, the use of the same judiciary to attack and/or censure senior officials of the Prosecutors' Offices considered as political adversaries is also noted. Such is the case of the Attorney General of Morelos, Uriel Carmona, accused and imprisoned for allegedly hindering the development of an investigation into a femicide case prosecuted in Mexico City. The case draws attention as it highlights the use of the Judiciary against Attorneys General who even enjoy constitutional jurisdiction. Likewise, the use of the same judiciary to attack and/or censure senior officials of the Prosecutors' Offices considered as political adversaries is also noted. Such is the case of the Attorney General of Morelos, Uriel Carmona, accused and imprisoned for allegedly hindering the development of an investigation into a femicide case prosecuted in Mexico City³².

Finally, the recent budget cuts that compromise the basic operation of the Prosecutors' Offices stand out. From 2021 to 2022 alone, State Prosecutors' Offices observed a 57% cut to their budget in real terms. A clear example of how budgetary pressure affects the tenure of the incumbent is the case of Zacatecas, where after two consecutive years of significant cuts, the Attorney General chose to resign. This is permissible since there is no regulatory provision that guarantees a minimum budgetary allocation for the diligent management of justice, which violates its budgetary autonomy. Finally, the recent budget cuts that compromise the basic

31 We refer to the following events: attack against the Attorney General's Office of the State [of Jalisco on July 11, 2023](#); illegal deprivation of liberty of a prosecutor of the Prosecutor General's Office of the State of Guerrero [on August 21, 2023](#); illegal deprivation of liberty and murder of the Regional Prosecutor of Tierra Caliente of the Prosecutor General's Office of the State of Guerrero [on September 9, 2023](#); [murder of](#) the Delegate of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic (FGR) in Guerrero [on September 12, 2023](#); attempt on the life of the Deputy Prosecutor of Investigation and the Director of Investigation of the Prosecutor General's Office of the State of Guerrero [on September 14, 2023](#), and attacks on the facilities of the Prosecutor General's Office of the State of Baja California during [November 2023](#).

32 El País, "The chaotic judicial situation of prosecutor Uriel Carmona". September 15, 2023, available at: <https://elpais.com/mexico/2023-09-15/la-caotica-situacion-judicial-del-fiscal-uriel-carmona.html>

operation of the Prosecutors' Offices stand out. From 2021 to 2022 alone, State Prosecutors' Offices observed a 57% cut to their budget in real terms³³.

The role of Prosecutors' Offices in safeguarding democracy

Although in Mexico there are no provisions that limit the participation of Prosecutors in the safeguarding of democracy, the current model provides for their participation from the state punitive power and from a criminalizing perspective.

The creation of Specialized Prosecutor's Office for Electoral Crimes (FEPADE by its Spanish acronym) in 1994 responded to the doubts generated in the 1988 elections. The investigation and punishment of electoral crimes focused on safeguarding democracy as a legal asset. FEPADE currently has a special law on the subject, so the State and Federal Prosecutors' Offices have competence in the protection of democracy and citizen participation. The creation of Specialized Prosecutor's Office for Electoral Crimes (FEPADE by its Spanish acronym) in 1994 responded to the doubts generated in the 1988 elections³⁴.

The preservation of democracy and human rights is a fundamental pillar for the development of just and equitable societies. However, it is crucial to recognize that depositing the safeguard of these values exclusively in the use of Criminal Law could prove problematic.

The indiscriminate and arbitrary use of Criminal Law through Prosecutors' Offices could lead to the criminalization of dissent and freedom of expression, thus undermining the same democratic principles and fundamental rights that were intended to be protected. It is imperative to seek a balance that fosters justice and legality without compromising the integrity of democratic institutions and human rights. Prosecutor's Offices can contribute to the construction of effective and inclusive safeguards of democracy as in civic education, citizen participation, accountability and collaboration with other institutions tasked with strengthening the very foundation of democracy.

Signatory organizations and collectives of the Collective "La Justicia que Queremos":

Mexico Evalúa (Mexico Evaluates),
Impunidad Cero (Zero Impunity),
Fundación para la Justicia y el Estado Democrático de Derecho (FJEDD) (Foundation for Justice and the Democratic Rule of Law),
Plataforma por la Paz y la Justicia en Guanajuato (Platform for Peace and Justice in Guanajuato),
Centro de Investigación de Crímenes Atroces (Atrocity Crimes Investigation Center),
Observatorio de Designaciones Públicas (ODP) (Observatory of Public Designations),
BÚSCAME BUSCANDO DESAPARECIDOS MÉXICO (LOOK FOR ME LOOKING FOR MISSING PEOPLE MEXICO),
Derechos Humanos y Litigio Estratégico Mexicano (DLM) (Human Rights and Mexican Strategic Litigation),

33 Mexico Evaluates. *Findings 2022 Monitoring and evaluation of criminal justice in Mexico*. 2023, pg. 87, available at: <https://www.mexicoevalua.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/HALLAZGOS2022.pdf>

34 Pérez Fernández del Castillo Germán, FEPADE, past, present and future, *Revista Nexos* 2018. Available at: <https://eljuegodelacorte.nexos.com.mx/fepade-pasado-presente-y-futuro/>

Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CMDPDH) (Mexican Commission for the Defence and Promotion of Human Rights)
Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano de Seguridad, Justicia y Legalidad (ONC) (National Citizen Observatory of Security, Justice and Legality),
México Unido contra la Delincuencia (Mexico United against Crime),
Borde (Border),
Justicia Pro Persona (Pro-Person Justice),
Morelos Rinde Cuentas (Morelos Accountable),
Fundación para el Debido Proceso Legal (DPLF) (Due Process of Law Foundation)